INTRODUCTION: RELATIVISM AND REALISM

The notion of the virtuous person (VP) has featured prominently in moral philosophy in the past few years. This renewed interest in the VP has naturally led to lively metaethical controversies concerning the theoretical standing of the VP, as well as many contemporary discussions devoted to various individual virtues, moral emotions, and competing lists of virtues.

Some of the usefulness of the idea of the VP and perhaps some of its initial theoretical appeal resides in the fact that one way of elucidating a conception of ethical requirements simply is to describe the life and character of a virtuous person. This strategy can be discerned in literature as well as in common discussions of ethics. It can also boast a long and illustrious presence in the philosophical literature – from the superhuman portrait of Socrates given in the symposium which serves to illustrate his views on ethics and eros, to Susan Wolf's indictment of both consequentialism and deontology for failing to provide a satisfactory conception of the good life (Wolf 1982).

Who is the VP and wherein lies the philosophical significance of this notion? The VP is someone who embodies ethical requirements, and who “gets it right” on every occasion: someone who is able to identify the correct course of action in any situation, and invariably pursues it.