Book contents
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- 7 The Backside of Habit
- 8 Habit, Ontology, and Embodied Cognition Without Borders
- 9 Clarifying the Character of Habits
- 10 Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality
- 11 Language, Habit, and the Future
- 12 Moral Habit
- 13 Habits of Goodness
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- Index
- References
10 - Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality
A Deweyan Reading
from Part II - The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2020
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- 7 The Backside of Habit
- 8 Habit, Ontology, and Embodied Cognition Without Borders
- 9 Clarifying the Character of Habits
- 10 Habits, Meaning, and Intentionality
- 11 Language, Habit, and the Future
- 12 Moral Habit
- 13 Habits of Goodness
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- Index
- References
Summary
Do nonrepresentational habits display intentionality, in the sense of aiming at, pointing to, or targeting some specific objects? I will here tackle this question from the resources of Dewey's pragmatism, and more precisely from his theory of habits and his functionalist theory of meaning. Meaning, for Dewey, is a normative phenomenon, only occurring in social and linguistic practices. The fact that utterances and thoughts can be about states of affairs does not require a specific mental property of pointing to or targeting for to be explained. Similarly, if behavior and habits can be described as being directed toward objects, this directedness is nothing before or beside the way our actions are normatively framed and organized in certain forms of organism–environment transactions, such as inquiry.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- HabitsPragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, pp. 223 - 244Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
References
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