Introduction: the organization and reorganization of the armaments industry

The specific characteristics of defence industry, tsarist ideology and Russian economic backwardness impart a multiple fascination to the study of the armaments industry. Like any sovereign state, the tsarist regime had no choice but to concern itself with matters relating to the output of defence goods. These it preferred to entrust to government-owned arsenals, shipyards and ironworks. To leave the production of military goods to the commercial sector exposed the government to the whim of the entrepreneur, whose prime concern was with the survival of his business. If entrepreneurs colluded, then the government, being their sole customer, would be unable to enforce competition in the arms trade. In practice, the tsarist regime rarely needed to confront these issues prior to 1905. Whether the government could or should close off for good the opportunities for the private sector remained an intermittently articulated question of principle that was ultimately decided by the practical needs of rearmament.

Few entrepreneurs were brave or foolish enough to enter the ‘arms bazaar’. The risks of entering this peculiar market required little emphasis. In the uncertain world of defence production, it made little sense to invest heavily in new plant or to recruit skilled workers, only to find that the government cut off their life-blood, whether by withdrawing orders altogether, by privileging the state sector or by importing arms.