Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- SECTION I BEYOND MARKET FAILURE
- 1 Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation
- 2 Effective Regulation through Credible Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Opportunity Costs of Superfund
- 3 From “State Interference” to the “Return to the Market”: The Rhetoric of Economic Regulation from the Old Gilded Age to the New
- 4 Lessons from Europe: Some Reflections on the European Union and the Regulation of Business
- 5 Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?
- SECTION II BEYOND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS
- SECTION III BEYOND COMMAND AND CONTROL
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
4 - Lessons from Europe: Some Reflections on the European Union and the Regulation of Business
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- Introduction
- SECTION I BEYOND MARKET FAILURE
- 1 Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation
- 2 Effective Regulation through Credible Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Opportunity Costs of Superfund
- 3 From “State Interference” to the “Return to the Market”: The Rhetoric of Economic Regulation from the Old Gilded Age to the New
- 4 Lessons from Europe: Some Reflections on the European Union and the Regulation of Business
- 5 Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?
- SECTION II BEYOND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS
- SECTION III BEYOND COMMAND AND CONTROL
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
Before the mid-1970s, the United States pioneered the regulation of product markets, labor markets, and the environment. But the intellectual and political assaults on social and economic regulation over the past thirty years, a process whose intellectual basis receives careful attention in Jessica Leicht's contribution for this volume, have left American regulators with neither the inclination to enforce the law, or in the case where such inclination persists, the staff to do so. So, for example, competition laws like the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Celler-Kefauver Act no longer have much bite, having given way to the idea that market concentration, mergers, and anticompetitive acts do not undermine competition as long as the antitrust division can see a glimmer of potentially contestable markets. Congressional appropriations bills have stripped regulatory bodies like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission of personnel and their ability to monitor infractions of the law.
At this historical moment, the main source of market and environmental regulation in the developed world has moved across the Atlantic, to Europe. Indeed, large American multinational corporations that have significant activities in Europe increasingly find themselves having to embed European rules and standards into their practices. So, for example, American firms that engage in anticompetitive behavior or mergers that might erode competition find themselves confronting European competition authorities who are skeptical of their claims that such activities are procompetitive.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Government and MarketsToward a New Theory of Regulation, pp. 143 - 163Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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