At the end of the previous chapter, I provided a short definition of what could or should be understood by the term actorness. In Figure 2.1, the concept of power appeared in two forms: internal and external power. Making use of Steven Lukes’ famous definition, I will begin this chapter with a brief description of how the EU's internal and external power can be analysed. I will then take a look at the literature which, from the end of the 1990s until the beginning of the euro crisis, started to qualify the EU, seemingly out of the blue, as a superpower (or in words to that effect); indeed, as a power with a high degree of external actorness—even if most authors contributing to the discussion did not use this notion explicitly. An important self-declared reason for this upgrading was the alleged economic and normative status of the EU in the international system. This is why I reproduce this discussion – in conjunction with the debate on Normative Power Europe (NPE) – in this chapter on the EU's trade policy: for if the EU is anything, it is a trading state with a large, integrated internal market; a single currency (for a majority of its member states); and a common trade policy towards non-EU countries.

Following this conceptual exposé, I will turn to the emergence, development, and current status of the EU's trade policy. The emphasis will be on the unique supranational character of the decision-making process, the most important institutional and power-political frameworks within which policy priorities are set, and the most significant dilemmas associated with European trade policy. I will end the chapter with two case studies. The first focuses on the hitherto unsuccessful trade agreement between the EU and the US, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This case study proves that an analysis of external relations should not be limited to a strict institutional enquiry but should also include power relations within society. In the second case study, I will consider the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), partly because of its highly disruptive effects on free trade but also because of the importance, yet again, of underlying power relations and the growing pressure, both internal and external, to modify this policy.