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Chapter 2 - Existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2021

George Di Giovanni
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montréal
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Summary

Existence is determinate being; its determinateness is existent determinateness, quality. Through its quality, something is opposed to an other; it is alterable and finite, negatively determined not only towards an other, but absolutely within it. This negation in it, in contrast at first with the finite something, is the infinite; the abstract opposition in which these determinations appear resolves itself into oppositionless infinity, into being-for-itself.

The treatment of existence is therefore in three divisions:

A. existence as such

B. something and other, finitude

C. qualitative infinity.

EXISTENCE AS SUCH

In existence (a) as such, its determinateness is first (b) to be distinguished as quality. The latter, however, is to be taken in both the two determinations of existence as reality and negation. In these determinacies, however, existence is equally reflected into itself, and, as so reflected, it is posited as (c) something, an existent.

Existence in general

Existence proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, the becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself, and existence therefore appears as a first from which the forward move is made. It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first.

It is not mere being but existence, or Dasein [in German]; according to its [German] etymology, it is being (Sein) in a certain place (da). But the representation of space does not belong here. As it follows upon becoming, existence is in general being with a non-being, so that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being. Non-being thus taken up into being with the result that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such.

The whole is likewise in the form or determinateness of being, since in becoming being has likewise shown itself to be only a moment – something sublated, negatively determined. It is such, however, for us, in our reflection; not yet as posited in it. What is posited, however, is the determinateness as such of existence, as is also expressed by the da (or “there”) of the Dasein.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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