Introduction

Having put aside two of the most usually deployed free will defences, it is worth mentioning two lines of thought that suggest that our problem is misconceived: as such, they might clarify the nature of the determinist challenge. In addition to discharging an obligation to do so (Chapter 3, p. 45), these issues will be considered here because such arguments ground much contemporary discussion of free will related topics: thus a student ignorant of them might find himself or herself at sea in the contemporary literature. As such, they offer research agendas, even if not dealing with our problem. Further, they shed a certain indirect light on the resolution of the problem offered in succeeding chapters.

Since this is the basis for our consideration, these positions can be treated here in broad brush strokes: in neither case need we attend to every detail of every argument, which is especially useful, given the substantial secondary literature.

Both positions challenge the setting-up of the problem of determinism here, by focusing on the relationship between free action and moral responsibility. First (p. 100), arguments derived from Strawson suggest that, since viewing others as moral agents (and seeing ourselves as so viewed) cannot be given up, questions of responsibility cannot depend on resolving those of determinism. So these arguments are pleas for a more realistic understanding of moral responsibility: more importantly, a reconsideration of cases where persons are not treated as responsible.