Book contents
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An Overview
- Part I On the Practical Implications of Free Will Skepticism
- Chapter 2 Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints
- Chapter 3 Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism
- Chapter 4 Beyond the Retributive System
- Part II Alternatives to Retributive Punishment
- Part III Free Will Skepticism and the Criminal Justice System
- Index
- References
Chapter 2 - Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints
from Part I - On the Practical Implications of Free Will Skepticism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 August 2019
Book contents
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An Overview
- Part I On the Practical Implications of Free Will Skepticism
- Chapter 2 Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints
- Chapter 3 Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism
- Chapter 4 Beyond the Retributive System
- Part II Alternatives to Retributive Punishment
- Part III Free Will Skepticism and the Criminal Justice System
- Index
- References
Summary
Recent free will denialism (FWD) tends to be optimistic, claiming that not only will the rejection of the belief in free will and moral responsibility not make matters dreadful but that we are indeed better off without them. I address the denialist claim that FWD has the philosophical resources to effectively safeguard human rights and respect for persons in the context of punishment, even without belief in free will, moral responsibility, and desert. I raise seven reasons for doubt concerning the ability of FWD to maintain deontological constraints. Together they present a strong case for doubting the optimism of FWD.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Free Will Skepticism in Law and SocietyChallenging Retributive Justice, pp. 29 - 42Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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