Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: New Critical formalism and identity in Americanist criticism
- Chapter 1 Types of interest: Scottish theory, literary nationalism, and John Neal
- Chapter 2 Sensing Hawthorne: the figure of Hawthorne's affect
- Chapter 3 “Life is an ecstasy”: Ralph Waldo Emerson and A. Bronson Alcott
- Chapter 4 Laws of experience: truth and feeling in Harriet Beecher Stowe
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 3 - “Life is an ecstasy”: Ralph Waldo Emerson and A. Bronson Alcott
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 June 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: New Critical formalism and identity in Americanist criticism
- Chapter 1 Types of interest: Scottish theory, literary nationalism, and John Neal
- Chapter 2 Sensing Hawthorne: the figure of Hawthorne's affect
- Chapter 3 “Life is an ecstasy”: Ralph Waldo Emerson and A. Bronson Alcott
- Chapter 4 Laws of experience: truth and feeling in Harriet Beecher Stowe
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
“Life is an ecstasy,” writes Emerson, at once celebrating life and rendering irrelevant all the specific characteristics of any actual experience. Similar neglect of the very lived experience he is calling magnificent colors the end of “The Poet”:
Wherever snow falls, or water flows, or birds fly, wherever day and night meet in twilight, wherever the blue heaven is hung by clouds, or sown with stars, wherever are forms with transparent boundaries, wherever are outlets into celestial space, wherever is danger, and awe, and love, there is Beauty, plenteous as rain, shed for thee, and though thou shouldest walk the world over, thou shalt not be able to find a condition inopportune or ignoble.
As these quotations indicate, experience is newly valued in Transcendentalism, but this value depends upon a certain indifference to the quality of such experience. This is part of Transcendentalism's rejection of Lockean empiricism, particularly the account of experience as the objective process in which a blank subject takes in knowledge of the concrete world. Yet the reaction isn't exactly to embrace the subject, either in the sense of the all-important ego identified with Emerson's “Self-Reliance,” or even in a more immanent interaction of self and world, for Transcendentalism explicitly rejected the definition of the subjective as the personal. In this regard, Christopher Newfield's objection, “Why do we call this self-reliance?” is accurate – although I would add that it isn't self-submission either.
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- Formalism, Experience, and the Making of American Literature in the Nineteenth Century , pp. 109 - 137Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007