Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Agricultural Policy, Regime Type, and Political Stability
- 3 Political Regime Type and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
- 4 Food Policy and Urban Unrest: A Global Analysis
- 5 Agricultural Rents, Landholding Inequality, and Authoritarian Regime Durability
- 6 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Germany, 1878-1890
- 7 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Malaysia, 1969-1980
- 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Food Policy and Urban Unrest: A Global Analysis
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 May 2019
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Agricultural Policy, Regime Type, and Political Stability
- 3 Political Regime Type and Agricultural Policy Outcomes
- 4 Food Policy and Urban Unrest: A Global Analysis
- 5 Agricultural Rents, Landholding Inequality, and Authoritarian Regime Durability
- 6 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Germany, 1878-1890
- 7 Agricultural Policy and Authoritarian Regime Durability in Malaysia, 1969-1980
- 8 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I explore the link between government food taxes and urban unrest. I analyze an event dataset on social and political disorder in cities across the developing world matched to cross-national data on consumer food taxes between 1965 and 2009. I estimate panel regressions of the effect of food taxes on unrest. I find no simple relationship between food policy and political instability in cities. However, when the effects of food taxes are allowed to vary by political regime type, I find that higher taxes are significantly associated with greater levels of unrest under anocracy. I also estimate instrumental variables regressions that exploit exogenous variation in the composition of a country's agricultural sector to identify the causal effect of food taxes on unrest. The results of these models align with those of the panel regressions. I find that higher food taxes are significantly correlated with greater unrest, but only under anocracies, which combine a lack of democratic accountability with a relatively permissive political opportunity structure.
Keywords
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- Information
- Food and PowerRegime Type, Agricultural Policy, and Political Stability, pp. 89 - 115Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019