In the conclusion, I discuss the contribution of the book and its implications for the study of authoritarian regimes, development, and democratization. In the long run, government policies that tax the agricultural sector lead to rural poverty, urbanization, and political instability. On the other hand, regimes that implement pro-farmer policies increasing agricultural prices are more likely to lock their countries into a long-run development trajectory that significantly decreases the risk of political instability and authoritarian regime collapse. By bolstering the incomes of rural farmers they mitigate poverty, slow rural-urban migration, promote economic growth, and decrease inequality. Rulers confronted with significant threats from both large concentrations of urban food consumers and landed elites cannot effectively use agricultural policy to address rural-urban conflict, because measures that are in the interests of the rural sector run invariably counter to those of the urban sector. These leaders are thus faced with unique challenges to their rule and a high likelihood of political instability. One likely outcome of this situation is a military dictatorship.