Guthrie v. Conway exemplifies the reluctance of many courts to allow victims of workplace sexual harassment to sue in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The employer in Guthrie escaped liability because the court did not regard numerous incidents of harassment as sufficiently “outrageous” conduct to justify tort recovery. The rewritten feminist dissent explains how courts often misuse summary judgment in hostile workplace environment cases and argues for a contextual application of the elements of IIED based on the victims’ experience. The feminist dissent would allow a jury to review the evidence in its totality, would not require the harassment to be overtly sexual to qualify as outrageous conduct, and would permit a tort claim regardless of whether the victim also had a viable claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The accompanying commentary catalogues the various techniques courts have used to exclude feminist perspectives in harassment cases and urges a greater role for tort litigation.