Stability in Political Ambition

This chapter explores the sources of stability of the Mexican regional compromise. An analysis of gubernatorial nominations allows me to show that politicians were in a political equilibrium: All major political players were willing to play within the rules of the game of progressive ambition established by the PRI because the system had become self-enforcing. Gubernatorial nominations were driven by a logic of unanimous approval by the main veto players, both at the national and local levels, which made the arrangement stable. The nomination game was underpinned by the peculiar crafting of institutional rules discussed in the previous chapter, including the no-reelection clause, federal control over electoral processes, and the staggered timing of elections. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to explain why local political actors complied with the set of rules created by the PRI to structure political ambition, even as their fiscal authority was threatened.

In terms of the theoretical framework in Chapter 1, I show how the problems of commitment and redistribution were easier to solve once politicians found a way to channel their political ambitions at the local level. The analysis of gubernatorial stability sheds light not just on the dynamics of local politics but also on the way in which, notwithstanding disagreements and differing political preferences of the president and the politicians in the regions, they could agree on cooperating and respecting each other through the nomination process within the hegemonic party.