Book contents
- Evidential Legal Reasoning
- Evidential Legal Reasoning
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Evidence As an Area of Knowledge
- Part II Convergences between Systems
- Part III On Evidential Inferences
- 7 Group Deliberative Virtues and Legal Epistemology
- 8 On Probatory Ostension and Inference
- 9 Inferences in Judicial Decisions About Facts
- 10 Silence as Evidence
- 11 Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors?
- Part IV Expert Evidence
- Part V Standards of Evidence As Decision-Making Rules
- Index
- References
11 - Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors?
from Part III - On Evidential Inferences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2022
Book contents
- Evidential Legal Reasoning
- Evidential Legal Reasoning
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Evidence As an Area of Knowledge
- Part II Convergences between Systems
- Part III On Evidential Inferences
- 7 Group Deliberative Virtues and Legal Epistemology
- 8 On Probatory Ostension and Inference
- 9 Inferences in Judicial Decisions About Facts
- 10 Silence as Evidence
- 11 Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors?
- Part IV Expert Evidence
- Part V Standards of Evidence As Decision-Making Rules
- Index
- References
Summary
As a number of modern sexual misconduct cases demonstrate, often there are multiple charges against a single individual under circumstances in which the proof of an individual charge may fall short of the required standard of proof, but in which it is clear – overwhelmingly, or beyond a reasonable doubt – that at least one of the charges is true, even if we cannot be sure which one. Building on earlier work by myself and Richard Zeckhauser, by Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, and by Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, among others, this paper, prepared for the World Congress on Evidential Reasoning at the University of Girona, offers a sympathetic examination of sanction imposition – inside and outside formal legal proceedings – on the basis of aggregate probabilities, and addresses a series of common objections. And the paper suggests that the greatest value of aggregating low (or lower) probability charges may be greatest outside the official judicial process. It also hints, albeit inconclusively, at the larger question of why the law focuses on acts when it is imposing sanctions rather than focusing on the actors who may have committed those acts.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Evidential Legal ReasoningCrossing Civil Law and Common Law Traditions, pp. 198 - 214Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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