Since completing this book, many of the dynamics discussed throughout have continued to proliferate in increasingly fraught terms. While arrivals on the central Mediterranean route were relatively low in 2019 compared to 2015–2016, arrival figures increased on the western route, as well as on the eastern route amidst threats that the Turkey–EU arrangements would no longer operate without further EU funding for Turkey.1 ‘Indeed, in early March 2020 increased numbers sought to enter Greece after Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced on 29 February that he was ‘opening the doors’. Many faced violent pushbacks by Greek authorities. Balkan route countries pledged to prevent new arrivals, Greece announced that it would not accept new asylum claims for a month, while the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, thanked Greece for its work as a ‘shield’ for the EU.2 This came following protests by those stuck in camps on the Greek island of Lesbos, who were teargassed by authorities.3 Meanwhile, temporary border controls remained in place in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria and France due to the ‘security situation in Europe’, the ‘serious threat to public policy and internal security’, the ‘severe threat to public order and internal security’, ‘migration and security policy’, the ‘security situation in Europe and continuous secondary movements’ and ‘terrorist threats and the situation at the external borders’, respectively.4 Relocation and the Common European Asylum Policy remained uncertain, as leaders failed to forge solidarity on asylum and relocation and as a new Commissioner in charge of migration heralded a ‘post-Dublin horizon’.5 The maltreatment of those taking flight in eastern Europe continued with allegations of Frontex involvement,6 while Frontex was also taken to court for a lack of transparency regarding Operation Triton.7 Frontex went on to win the case and charged the pro-transparency campaigners nearly 24,000 Euros in legal fees.