Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 Germany
- Chapter 3 Ireland
- Chapter 4 France
- Chapter 5 Poland
- Chapter 6 The EU Institutions
- Chapter 7 Benelux: the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg
- Chapter 8 Nordic Member States: Denmark, Finland and Sweden
- Chapter 9 Mediterranean Member States: Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta
- Chapter 10 Iberia: Spain and Portugal
- Chapter 11 Baltic Member States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
- Chapter 12 Central European Member States: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
- Chapter 13 South-Eastern European Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia
- Chapter 14 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 EU–UK Relations in Numbers
- Appendix 2 Chronology
- Contributors
- Index
Chapter 2 - Germany
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 Germany
- Chapter 3 Ireland
- Chapter 4 France
- Chapter 5 Poland
- Chapter 6 The EU Institutions
- Chapter 7 Benelux: the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg
- Chapter 8 Nordic Member States: Denmark, Finland and Sweden
- Chapter 9 Mediterranean Member States: Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta
- Chapter 10 Iberia: Spain and Portugal
- Chapter 11 Baltic Member States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
- Chapter 12 Central European Member States: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
- Chapter 13 South-Eastern European Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia
- Chapter 14 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 EU–UK Relations in Numbers
- Appendix 2 Chronology
- Contributors
- Index
Summary
On his first foreign trip after being elected German president in early 2017, Frank-Walter Steinmeier chose to visit the European Parliament to make a strong plea for European integration. In the speech he characterized Brexit, and in particular the conduct of the Leave campaign, as “irresponsible” (Steinmeier 2017). This notion of irresponsibility, of political brinkmanship for short-sighted political gain, best describes the impression of the German political elite towards the Brexit vote and former UK prime minister David Cameron’s decision to seek a renegotiated UK–EU relationship. This was reflected in Chancellor Merkel’s controversial statement in May 2017, when she argued that, after the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote, the “times when we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over” (Henley 2017).
The story of British–German relations in the wake of the Brexit vote is therefore more than just about difficult negotiations at the European level. It is also a story about a misjudged relationship, when misconceptions on both sides led – and continue to lead – to miscalculations and, ultimately, disappointments and a distancing in relations. This is particularly damaging at a time when a functioning bilateral relationship could have been crucial to shaping both Europe and the wider world. These misconceptions go both ways. On the UK side, from the outset of the renegotiation Germany was perceived as the prime ally among the EU27, and one that would go a long way to secure British membership in the EU as a balance to France, and to keep a close economic partner in the Union. During and after the Brexit referendum, leading proponents of Brexit argued that, because of the close economic ties, the German government would take a soft stance on Brexit negotiations in order to protect its economic interests. In both cases, however, for the German government, the political interest in safeguarding the European Union trumped any other considerations, resulting in a hard and clear stance on the renegotiation and in the lead-up to the commencement of formal exit negotiations with the United Kingdom.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Europe's BrexitEU Perspectives on Britain's Vote to Leave, pp. 17 - 34Publisher: Agenda PublishingPrint publication year: 2018
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