The previous chapter has focused on the informal communication flows between governments in shaping the common pension market. However, informal signaling and communication processes also influence the effectiveness of the European Commission as agenda setter. As the only institution in the EU that can formally propose legislation, the Commission can play a powerful role in securing member states' commitment to EU covenants. However, failure to act as “efficient” agenda setter may cause the Commission to get defeated in the formal decision-making process. As a result, the Commission has an incentive to assemble strategic coalitions before a proposal is put to a formal vote. Yet, which factors constitute efficient agenda setting in the area of pension market integration? What was the Commission's role in the bargaining fiasco of the early 1990s and the successful creation of the single pension market in 2003?

This chapter analyzes the agenda setting strategy employed by the European Commission. We argue that negotiations had failed in the early 1990s because of the Commission's inability to restrict the menu of policy options and frame pension market integration in a way that resonated with key domestic actors. The Commission's lopsided representation of supply-side interests and emphasis on the financial aspects of demographic aging eroded its reputation as honest broker. Furthermore, rivalries between the two Directorates-General involved in the directive prevented efficient problem solving. Consequently, negotiations ended in gridlock, although all countries had initially signalled an interest in creating a single pension market.