The EU case study will focus on the intergovernmental decision-making process. It is this process which proved most ambiguous theoretically in the NATO case, and it is here that the factor of interest – the structure of bargaining power – varies between NATO and the EU. This variation makes it possible to disentangle the potentially confounding effects of bargaining and shaming. The EU intergovernmental process is a hard case for rhetorical action because it needed to prevail against the material interests of most member states, a coalition with superior bargaining power, and an initial bargaining outcome (association) that was already put in treaty form and appeared to represent a stable equilibrium in light of the member state interests and power structure.

The chapter is divided into sections on “rhetorical commitment,” “rhetorical argumentation” and “rhetorical entrapment” – the three main analytical phases in the shaming process. I seek to show that the Community has committed itself ideologically and institutionally to the integration of all European liberal societies since its beginnings and has continually confirmed this commitment in its rhetoric. This rhetorical commitment created the prerequisite for effective shaming during the enlargement process. The “drivers” among the member states as well as the associated CEE states regularly justified their demands for enlargement on the grounds of this commitment and of the community's collective identity.