Political commentators, and the general public, frequently express skepticism concerning the explanations given by states for engaging in “humanitarian interventions,” often attributing to the interveners rather more self-interested reasons for action than those offered by the interveners themselves. Underlying this skepticism, and reflected in the philosophical literature, is a concern that an otherwise permissible instance of intervention might be rendered impermissible if the intervening state’s motivations are not genuinely humanitarian.

In this chapter, I argue for what I call the justification-basedaccount of humanitarian intervention, according to which the permissibility of humanitarian intervention is determined by two central criteria. The first is that there exists a sound justification for intervention – roughly, that there is a threatened or ongoing process of widespread and serious rights violations that can be averted only by military force and such force is proportionate. This criterion can be satisfied ad bellum.

The second criterion is that the actions of interveners are reasonably expected to aid. This criterion applies largely to the in bello behavior of the intervening state. I defend the priority of this criterion against Alex Bellamy’s suggestion that the intentions of interveners are central to the permissibility of intervention. I suggest that both intentions-based and motives-based views wrongly prioritize the moral character of the intervener over the interests of the potential benei ciaries of intervention. This is not to deny that intentions or motives are ever relevant to permissibility, but to make the more limited claim that in situations in which one can act to avert signii cant suffering, imperfect intentions or motives do not render so acting impermissible.