Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- A note on the economics of institutions
- Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview
- 1 Toward an understanding of property rights
- Economic variables and the development of the law: the case of western mineral rights
- 2 Impediments to institutional change in the former Soviet system
- Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system: a property rights–based approach
- 3 Transaction costs and economic development
- Public institutions and private transactions: a comparative analysis of the legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile
- 4 The evolution of modern institutions of growth
- Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
- 5 Regulation in a dynamic setting
- The political economy of controls: American sugar
- 6 Price controls, property rights, and institutional change
- Roofs or stars: the stated intents and actual effects of a rents ordinance
- 7 Regulating natural resources: the evolution of perverse property rights
- Legally induced technical regress in the Washington salmon fishery
- 8 The politics of institutional change in a representative democracy
- A political theory of the origin of property rights: airport slots
- 9 The economics and politics of institutional change
- Paternalism in agricultural labor contracts in the U.S. South: implications for the growth of the welfare state
- Epilogue: economic performance through time
- Author index
- Subject index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
2 - Impediments to institutional change in the former Soviet system
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- A note on the economics of institutions
- Empirical work in institutional economics: an overview
- 1 Toward an understanding of property rights
- Economic variables and the development of the law: the case of western mineral rights
- 2 Impediments to institutional change in the former Soviet system
- Why economic reforms fail in the Soviet system: a property rights–based approach
- 3 Transaction costs and economic development
- Public institutions and private transactions: a comparative analysis of the legal and regulatory environment for business transactions in Brazil and Chile
- 4 The evolution of modern institutions of growth
- Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England
- 5 Regulation in a dynamic setting
- The political economy of controls: American sugar
- 6 Price controls, property rights, and institutional change
- Roofs or stars: the stated intents and actual effects of a rents ordinance
- 7 Regulating natural resources: the evolution of perverse property rights
- Legally induced technical regress in the Washington salmon fishery
- 8 The politics of institutional change in a representative democracy
- A political theory of the origin of property rights: airport slots
- 9 The economics and politics of institutional change
- Paternalism in agricultural labor contracts in the U.S. South: implications for the growth of the welfare state
- Epilogue: economic performance through time
- Author index
- Subject index
- POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS
Summary
REFORMING THEORIES OF REFORM
According to the modern theory of institutions, two factors are critical to the performance of an economic system: the information held by the various actors and their incentives. Yet in the past and even in our times, scholars have frequently ignored these factors in their proposals for reform.
In 1908 the Italian scholar Enrico Barone published an article entitled (in translation) “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State.” Barone's article encouraged economists and other social scientists to follow a path that took them away from the central issues of information and incentives. Barone, a pioneer in mathematical modeling, used his tools to establish a formal equivalence between the basic categories in a market economy based on private ownership and those in a socialist economy managed by a central authority. In the two instances, optimization involved solving a comparable set of equations.
Barone's vision of the fundamental issues of an economic system has been shared by many scholars in the twentieth century. In the 1930s the famous Lange–Lerner blueprint of a managed economy envisioned a system of “market socialism” where a central planning bureau (CPB) balanced supply and demand by using a trial-and-error method to set prices. The managers of the state-owned enterprises were to be given instructions hailing from Econ 101: (a) pick a combination of productive factors that minimize average costs and (b) set marginal costs equal to the prices determined by the CPB.
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- Information
- Empirical Studies in Institutional Change , pp. 59 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996