Whatever criticisms may be made of a system, which is designed to consolidate a partitioning of national markets by means of national quotas, the effects of which will be examined later, the fact remains that if it leaves in practice a residual field of competition, that field comes within the provisions of the rules of competition. § 24 Judgment of 16 December 1975, 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73, Suiker Unie [1975] ECR 1663, 1915

The EU Sugar markets, under the CMO Sugar, are highly conducive to tacit collusion. The geographical separation of markets minimises the need for communication between the firms. A number of possible minor reforms could make the tacit collusion harder to sustain. Free trade would undoubtedly break any tacitly collusive behaviour and bring prices to the level of the world market, such a profound change is not realistic in the short run however. Swedish Competition Authority, Sweet Fifteen: The Competition on the EU Sugar Markets, Report 7/2002: 88.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently private damages claims arising from competition law (EU or domestic) violations have been rare in Spain. The few successful damage claims to date, referred predominantly to violations of Article 102 TFEU (or domestic equivalent). For that reason, the judgments recently delivered by the Spanish Supreme Court awarding € 5 million in damages on the two follow-on actions in the sugar cartel case is of major significance for future antitrust damages claims in Spain.

This chapter considers the relevant considerations made by the Spanish Supreme Court. In particular, it notes the Supreme Court approach as to the legal force given to public enforcement decisions, the calculation of damages, the Court's approach to the passing-on defence and the standing of indirect purchasers. To position the discussion in context, the article begins with a review of the functioning and singularities of the sugar industry and describes the Spanish Competition Tribunal decision uncovering and sanctioning the sugar cartel.

THE SUGAR INDUSTRIES

Certain features of sugar industries make them prone to anti-competitive practices. The raw materials used for sucrose production (sugarcane and sugar beet), are subjected to intense government regulation in many countries.