Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-07T13:18:47.164Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

10 - How gender regimes differ

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2009

Robert E. Goodin
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
James Mahmud Rice
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Antti Parpo
Affiliation:
Somero Social & Health Services
Lina Eriksson
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
Get access

Summary

Among feminists themselves it has long been axiomatic that what social-welfare arrangements best promote the interests of women is a question that admits of no single, simple answer. The interests of women are many and varied. Given that heterogeneity, there is no one outcome that is ‘good for all women’.

All theorists of the welfare state surely know that, if they only stopped to think about it. In attempting to ‘gender’ their analyses of welfare states, however, they often proceed in ways that elide it. Among the Scandinavian voices that often dominate these discussions, it is typically taken for granted that what it is for a regime to be ‘woman-friendly’ is to promote female labour-force participation. Ironically, almost the opposite was taken for granted in US debates surrounding the 1996 welfare reforms: it was seen as distinctly ‘woman-unfriendly’ to push poor single mothers into paid labour by withdrawing public assistance.

Women's interests vary in part because their social circumstances vary. Women's interests vary, too, in part because their preferences vary. Catherine Hakim, as we have already seen, makes much of the heterogeneity in women's preferences over issues of ‘work–life balance’. On her (much contested) count, perhaps a fifth of mothers are firmly home-centred and prefer to make a career of marriage and child-raising, with only a fifth being resolutely work-centred (the large remainder being prepared to go either way depending on opportunities and incentives).

Type
Chapter
Information
Discretionary Time
A New Measure of Freedom
, pp. 153 - 176
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×