Epistemic responsibility is derived from the ethical nature of the Ego-Alter relations and is one of the axioms of dialogical epistemology of daily living. Like other dialogical axioms, it is relational. This is exemplified by Rommetveit’s and Arendt’s cases, which show that both the assumed epistemic equality and inequality between the Self and Other can entail epistemic responsibility or its denial.

Examples of Bakhtin and Levinas illustrate that epistemic responsibility takes on different forms. According to Bakhtin’s perspective the Ego cannot escape responsibility uniqueness and integrity. In Levinas’s perspective the Self’s responsibility for the Other is unlimited and unquestionable: it is the primary principle of human existence. Responsibility for the Other takes the form of action in the face of injustice. If my neighbour commits an evil act against Others, then I am responsible if I do not act on behalf of Justice.

Among contemporary challenges to epistemic responsibility is bureaucratization that penetrates institutions like health services and universities. An assault on sciences by bureaucratization, Patočka noted, is also an assault on the principle of scientific conscience, which must be resisted by establishing scientific solidarity among practicing scientists. Patočka calls for conscience and epistemic responsibility of scientists and professionals.