Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introductory essay
- General introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and the translation
- Meditations on First Philosophy
- Selections from the Objections and Replies
- On Meditation One
- On Meditation Two
- On Meditation Three
- On Meditation Four
- On Meditation Five
- On Meditation Six
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
On Meditation Six
from Selections from the Objections and Replies
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introductory essay
- General introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and the translation
- Meditations on First Philosophy
- Selections from the Objections and Replies
- On Meditation One
- On Meditation Two
- On Meditation Three
- On Meditation Four
- On Meditation Five
- On Meditation Six
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
Summary
How does it follow, from the fact that he is aware of nothing else belonging to his essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it? I must confess that I am somewhat slow, but I have been unable to find anywhere in the Second Meditation an answer to this question. As far as I can gather, however, the author does attempt a proof of this claim in the Sixth Meditation, since he takes it to depend on his having clear knowledge of God, which he had not yet arrived at in the Second Meditation. This is how the proof goes:
I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated, at least by God. The question of what kind of power is required to bring about such a separation does not affect the judgement that the two things are distinct… Now on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Descartes: Meditations on First PhilosophyWith Selections from the Objections and Replies, pp. 107 - 116Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996