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Chapter 2 - Democracy, transaction costs and political parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Simon Hix
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abdul G. Noury
Affiliation:
Université Libre de Bruxelles
Gérard Roland
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Early social scientists, like Moisei Ostrogoski, Robert Michels, Lord Bryce and Max Weber, became interested in the relationship between democracy and political parties with the onset of democratic politics in Europe at the start of the twentieth century. It would be impossible and inappropriate for us to review all the work done on this subject in the ensuing century. As a short-cut, we start the discussion in this chapter by identifying two contemporary accounts of democratic politics that have very different conceptions about the role of political parties. The comparison of these two views will help in presenting our positions.

A first view emphasises that elected representatives mainly defend their constituencies' interests. In this view, a parliament is likely to be fragmented into the many constituencies that are represented within its walls. The smaller the size of the constituencies (the electoral districts) the better it is for democracy since smaller and more homogeneous groups can be better defended by their representatives. According to the same logic, the position of the elected representatives should be as close as possible to their constituencies' interests. Parties should, on the contrary, be seen with suspicion because they tend to create a distance between elected representatives and the citizens. We call this view ‘citizen-delegate democracy’.

The second view considers that strong parties are fundamental for the good functioning of democracy. Parties are the natural intermediary between voters and the democratic decision-making process.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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