During the last three decades, the pattern of mobilization in Thailand shows an unclear relationship to democratization. In the first instance, “democratization” itself is somewhat difficult to pinpoint, since there were periods of more open politics followed by military coups. A long decade of semi-democratic rule gradually eased Thailand toward a full electoral democracy and, while many strong characteristics of democracy prevailed for several years, nevertheless it faltered as the armed forces repeatedly intervened to prevent deep reform.1 Second, Malay-Muslim mobilization has been weak, and even somewhat difficult to identify, as unknown perpetrators were the most frequent instigators of violent attacks, against the backdrop of an apparently quiescent Malay-Muslim majority. The worse violence, after 2002, coincided with a relatively stable period of democratic governance when the Constitution of 1997 had made possible the election for the first time of a majority government led by Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai in 2001.