Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Preface
- 1 PATHS OF POLICY MAKING
- 2 CHOOSING HOW TO DECIDE
- 3 TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
- 4 THE DECISION TO DELEGATE
- 5 DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
- 6 DELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
- 7 DELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
- 8 DELEGATION AND ISSUE AREAS
- 9 CONCLUSION
- AN AFTERWORD ON COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONS
- APPENDICES
- References
- Index
- Titles in the series
5 - DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Preface
- 1 PATHS OF POLICY MAKING
- 2 CHOOSING HOW TO DECIDE
- 3 TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
- 4 THE DECISION TO DELEGATE
- 5 DATA AND POSTWAR TRENDS
- 6 DELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS
- 7 DELEGATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
- 8 DELEGATION AND ISSUE AREAS
- 9 CONCLUSION
- AN AFTERWORD ON COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONS
- APPENDICES
- References
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
When confronted with the difficulty in making whole numbers fit measurements which imperfect human beings, using imperfect sense organs, make with imperfect instruments in an imperfect and changing world, the practical man was long content to go on adding fresh divisions to his scale of measurement.
Lancelot Hogben, Mathematics for the MillionsIt is clear that a number of data sets will be necessary to test the nine propositions laid out in the previous chapter: roll-call votes, committee membership, issue areas, and so on. We set aside this chapter, though, to examine the one data set unique to the present study, namely, a measure of executive discretion. Our theory provides us with two starting points in this task. First, as our model centers on the passage of legislation, our proper unit of analysis is a law. Second, discretion in our model is composed of both delegation and constraints – the former giving power to the executive and the latter circumscribing its limits.
In constructing our discretion index, we are forced, to some extent, to rely on individual judgment. But to minimize subjectivity, we devised a set of systematic coding rules and procedures for each element of the data set. In this chapter and its accompanying appendixes, we describe our sample of laws, detail how we code and construct our key variable of interest, and present some summary statistics and trends in executive discretion over time.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Delegating PowersA Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers, pp. 86 - 120Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999