Are the dead ends in themselves?

It has become an ethical commonplace that we should always treat people as ends in themselves, and never merely as means (Kant 2002: §2). We satisfy Kant's resounding principle in the case of living persons by regarding them as intrinsically valuable beings who may not be treated principally as sources of advantage to ourselves. Predatory or exploitative attitudes to others are incompatible with the respect that is properly owed to their humanity. It is true, of course, that none of us could prosper or even survive without a lot of assistance from other people. But Kant's principle is not the impossible injunction to be entirely self-sufficient. Rather, we are obliged to accord importance to others' needs and interests as well as our own, and to make sure that the flow of benefits is not oneway traffic. We must be ready to give as well as take.

So much for our duty to the living. What about the dead? Do they retain the status of ends-in-themselves? Or does moral significance, or the possession of rights, cease when a person breathes her last? Living human beings are self-conscious subjects capable of leading rich and rewarding lives; dead ones are not or, it might be more pertinent to say, no longer are. Obviously our moral relations with the dead must be very different from those we have with the living.