Book contents
- Costly Calculations
- Costly Calculations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Price Theory of War
- 3 Calculating War’s Price: What’s It Worth, and How Much Will It Cost?
- 4 The Price Theory of War in Action: Experimental Demonstrations of the Impacts of Expected Costs and Valuable War Aims
- 5 Conflict Dynamics across Space and Time: Public Opinion in the Korean and Vietnam Wars
- 6 Getting Wartime Information from Over-There to Over-Here: News Media and Social Networks
- 7 Elite Opinion Formation and Its Electoral Consequences
- 8 Conclusion: Wars, Casualties, Politics, and Policies
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Elite Opinion Formation and Its Electoral Consequences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 June 2021
- Costly Calculations
- Costly Calculations
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Price Theory of War
- 3 Calculating War’s Price: What’s It Worth, and How Much Will It Cost?
- 4 The Price Theory of War in Action: Experimental Demonstrations of the Impacts of Expected Costs and Valuable War Aims
- 5 Conflict Dynamics across Space and Time: Public Opinion in the Korean and Vietnam Wars
- 6 Getting Wartime Information from Over-There to Over-Here: News Media and Social Networks
- 7 Elite Opinion Formation and Its Electoral Consequences
- 8 Conclusion: Wars, Casualties, Politics, and Policies
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Casualties affect elections in two ways. First, wartime variables affected position formation, where higher state casualties increased the likelihood that challengers openly opposed the war. Second, casualties influence Senate elections directly. Incumbents are held responsible for the conduct of the war, and their vote share is adversely affected by higher casualty rates in their states. Although both incumbents and challengers face constraints, our findings suggest that incumbents face the greatest constraints while challenger behavior is endogenous to casualties. Candidates react strategically to the information provided to them by their state-level casualties, suggesting strategy is not reserved to the battlefield. Candidates behave strategically when formulating wartime positions, rightly perceiving that electorates respond to candidate position differences when voting. Analyses of elections during the Iraq and of Senator positions are taken during the Vietnam Wars. Even when national issues dominate headlines, advertisements, and campaigning, all politics remain local – especially wartime politics.
Keywords
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- Costly CalculationsA Theory of War, Casualties, and Politics, pp. 189 - 220Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021