Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T08:00:11.249Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

18 - Decision Making and Action: The Search for a Dominance Structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Henry Montgomery
Affiliation:
Professor of Cognitive Psychology, Stockholm University
Sarah Lichtenstein
Affiliation:
Decision Research. Oregon
Paul Slovic
Affiliation:
Decision Research, Oregon
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

There is a close link between decision making and action. By making a decision a person commits herself to act in a certain way. However, in behavioral decision research, the link between decision making and action is largely neglected. The reason may be that decision making primarily is seen as a question of forming preferences, that is, a question of finding the better or best alternative. However, in contrast to decisions preferences are not necessarily linked to actions. An individual may prefer alternative x to alternative y without committing herself to any action. That is, the alternatives in preferences need not be action alternatives (e.g., preferences among articles of consumption), which always is true in a decision situation (e.g., in decisions to buy an article of consumption).

As a consequence of a large number of empirical findings, the presumed synonymy between preferences and decisions or choices has become problematic. First, it has been found that preferences in a nonchoice context may be inconsistent with people's choices (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Second, it has been shown that people's preferences may be practically unrelated to people's actions; (Lindberg, Gärling, & Montgomery, 1990; Montgomery, 1993; Rohrman & Borcharding, 1988). That is, people do not necessarily enact an alternative that they prefer. The reason may be that the preference has been formed without making a decision to enact the preferred alternative.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×