The previous chapters offered evidence that voters expect lawmakers to address problems in society and are willing to hold them collectively accountable. Members of Congress report that they believe congressional accomplishments have implications for their own reelection prospects. Lawmakers have collective incentives to engage in problem solving because voters’ perceptions of congressional performance have demonstrable electoral consequences. How then do problem-solving incentives in the electoral arena affect organization and behavior in the legislative arena?

When it comes to addressing the many and varied problems and policy demands of voters, members of Congress rely upon the body’s primary governing institution – its committee system. This is certainly not a novel point of emphasis. Scholars and lawmakers alike draw attention to the central roles of committees in lawmaking. Scholars have portrayed the legislative work of Congress as primarily committee centered as far back as Woodrow Wilson (1981 [1885]), Lauros McConachie (1898), and George Galloway (1946), and this view still largely persists today. Longtime representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) describes the normal functioning of Congress as a “bottom-up” process where “committees with relevant expertise [write] the nation’s laws” (2010, 132).