In the previous chapter, we presented two different perspectives on the problem of complicity in international law: according to the traditional, bilateral outlook, it may appear difficult to accommodate considerations of complicity in the strictly bilateral legal relationships which are brought about by the law of State responsibility. However, we have seen that international law had no difficulties in providing rules for a problem which is very close to that of complicity, namely, to determine what obligations the law of neutrality provides for third States in times of armed conflict. We have also seen that the development of international law beyond its original bilateral constraints, be they real or perceived, is no panacea to hold complicit States responsible. It is very much in the spirit of the move ‘from bilateralism to community interest’ and the legal developments associated with it to assume that international law will no longer tolerate complicit State behaviour. However, neither the establishment of a system of collective security nor the recognition of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes automatically lead to this result.

We have thus seen that the two conceptual approaches that are usually adopted when the significance of the concept of complicity in international law is considered do not establish conclusive results. In other words, neither is international law as ‘backward-oriented’ as to erect structural barriers to hold complicit States responsible (and this applies not only to contemporary international law), nor can one infer wide-ranging consequences from its alleged ‘progressiveness’.