Events in the world of money move fast; but it does not follow that principles shift as quickly. In addressing this edition to the French public, I may be excused, therefore, if I seek to apply, in a few words, the principles of this book to the changes which have come over the financial situation of France during the past six months.

I have maintained for a long time that a substantial fall in the value of the franc was inevitable unless there was to be a more drastic change in the policy of the French Treasury than was likely to be politically feasible. This fall has now taken place. The effect of the fall on the mind of the public is to engender increased distrust and fear, and the atmosphere is pessimistic. Nevertheless the establishment of financial equilibrium is easier now than it was before the fall took place.

Let me first clear out of the way certain opinions and arguments, which appear in the past to have influenced opinion, yet are altogether contrary to good sense:

It has never been officially admitted that the value of the franc can ever be fixed at any other value, either in gold or in commodities, than its pre-war gold parity. This is absurd. A restoration of the pre-war gold parity, apart from other intolerable consequences, would increase fourfold the present burden of the French National Debt.