Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Religion and Morality
- Economics and Politics
- Science and Race
- Chapter 16 How Intuitive Beliefs Inoculate Us against Scientific Ones
- Chapter 17 COVID-19: Conspiracies and Collateral Damage vs Constructive Critique
- Chapter 18 Believing in Race vs Knowing Ourselves
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Index
- References
Chapter 16 - How Intuitive Beliefs Inoculate Us against Scientific Ones
from Science and Race
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2022
Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Religion and Morality
- Economics and Politics
- Science and Race
- Chapter 16 How Intuitive Beliefs Inoculate Us against Scientific Ones
- Chapter 17 COVID-19: Conspiracies and Collateral Damage vs Constructive Critique
- Chapter 18 Believing in Race vs Knowing Ourselves
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Index
- References
Summary
Scientific ideas are difficult to teach, difficult to learn, and difficult to accept as true because they contradict our intuitive theories of the world, constructed in childhood but retained across the lifespan, influencing our thinking even as adults. In this chapter, I discuss what intuitive theories are, where they come from, and why they blind us to more accurate theories of the world. I explore two case studies – projectile motion and evolutionary adaptation – to illustrate how intuitive theories are historically entrenched, culturally widespread, resistant to counterevidence, maladaptive for behavior, and seemingly inerasable. I conclude by considering the impact of intuitive theories on human belief and behavior more generally.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cognitive Science of BeliefA Multidisciplinary Approach, pp. 353 - 373Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
References
Allaire-Duquette, G., Foisy, L. M. B., Potvin, P., Riopel, M., Larose, M., & Masson, S. (2021) An fMRI study of scientists with a PhD in physics confronted with naïve ideas in science. Science of Learning.Google Scholar
Au, T. K. F., Chan, C. K., Chan, T. K., Cheung, M. W., Ho, J. Y., & Ip, G. W. (2008) Folkbiology meets microbiology: a study of conceptual and behavioral change. Cognitive Psychology, 57(1), 1–19.Google Scholar
Baillargeon, R., Needham, A., & DeVos, J. (1992) The development of young infants’ intuitions about support. Early Development and Parenting, 1(2), 69–78.Google Scholar
Barlev, M., Mermelstein, S., & German, T. C. (2017) Core intuitions about persons coexist and interfere with acquired Christian beliefs about God. Cognitive Science, 41(S3), 425–454.Google Scholar
Bishop, B. & Anderson, C. A. (1990) Student conceptions of natural selection and its role in evolution. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 27(5), 415–427.Google Scholar
Blancke, S., Hjermitslev, H. H., & Kjaergaard, P. C. (Eds.) (2014) Creationism in Europe. John Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blancke, S., Van Breusegem, F., De Jaeger, G., Braeckman, J., & Van Montagu, M. (2015) Fatal attraction: the intuitive appeal of GMO opposition. Trends in Plant Science, 20 (7), 414–418.Google Scholar
Bordelon, C. (2021) Conspiracies attack coroner: families demand COVID-19 diagnoses be removed from loved ones’ death certificates. KOAA News, 5. www.koaa.com/news/coronavirus/conspiracies-attack-coroner-families-demand-covid-19-diagnoses-be-removed-from-loved-ones-death-certificatesGoogle Scholar
Bowler, P. J. (1983) The eclipse of Darwinism: anti-Darwinian theories in the decades around 1900. John Hopkins University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caramazza, A., McCloskey, M., & Green, B. (1981) Naïve beliefs in “sophisticated” subjects: misconceptions about trajectories of objects. Cognition, 9(2), 117–123.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carey, S. (2000) Science education as conceptual change. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 21(1), 13–19.Google Scholar
Chi, M. T. H. (2005) Commonsense conceptions of emergent processes: why some misconceptions are robust. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 14(2), 161–199.Google Scholar
Clark, D. B., D’Angelo, C. M., & Schleigh, S. P. (2011) Comparison of students’ knowledge structure coherence and understanding of force in the Philippines, Turkey, China, Mexico, and the United States. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 20(2), 207–0261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clement, J. (1982) Students’ preconceptions in introductory mechanics. American Journal of Physics, 50(1), 66–71.Google Scholar
Clement, J. (1993) Using bridging analogies and anchoring intuitions to deal with students’ preconceptions in physics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(10), 1241–1257.Google Scholar
diSessa, A. (1993) Toward an epistemology of physics. Cognition & Instruction, 10(2–3) 105–225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dunbar, K., Fugelsang, J., & Stein, C. (2007) Do naïve theories ever go away? Using brain and behavior to understand changes in concepts. In Lovett, M. & Shah, P. (Eds.). Thinking with data (pp. 193–206). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Google Scholar
Eimer, G. H. T. (1898) On orthogenesis and the importance of natural selection in species formations (McCormack, T. J., Trans.). Open Court.Google Scholar
Evans, E. M., Spiegel, A. N., Gram, W. et al. (2010) A conceptual guide to natural history museum visitors’ understanding of evolution. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 47(3), 326–353.Google Scholar
Fischbein, E., Stavy, R., & Ma-Naim, H. (1989) The psychological structure of naïve impetus conceptions. International Journal of Science Education, 11(1), 71–81.Google Scholar
Foisy, L. M. B., Potvin, P., Riopel, M., & Masson, S. (2015) Is inhibition involved in overcoming a common physics misconception in mechanics? Trends in Neuroscience and Education, 4 (1–2) 26–36.Google Scholar
Galileo, G. (1632) Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems, Ptolemaic & Copernican. University of California Press.Google Scholar
Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. M. (2012) Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1085–1108.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gregory, T. R. (2009) Understanding natural selection: essential concepts and common misconceptions. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 2(2), 156–175.Google Scholar
Halloun, I. A. & Hestenes, D. (1985) Common sense concepts about motion. American Journal of Physics, 53(11), 1056–1065.Google Scholar
Heddy, B. C. & Nadelson, L. S. (2012) A global perspective of the variables associated with acceptance of evolution. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 5(3), 412–418.Google Scholar
Howe, C., Tavares, J. T., & Devine, A. (2012) Everyday conceptions of object fall: explicit and tacit understanding during middle childhood. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 111(3), 351–366.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jee, B. D., Uttal, D. H., Spiegel, A., & Diamond, J. (2015) Expert-novice differences in mental models of viruses, vaccines, and the causes of infectious disease. Public Understanding of Science, 24(2), 241–256.Google Scholar
Kaiser, M. K., Jonides, J., & Alexander, J. (1986) Intuitive reasoning about abstract and familiar physics problems. Memory & Cognition, 14(4), 308–312.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2013) Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1074–1083.Google Scholar
Kim, E. & Pak, S. J. (2002) Students do not overcome conceptual difficulties after solving 1000 traditional problems. American Journal of Physics, 70(7), 759–765.Google Scholar
Kim, I. K. & Spelke, E. S. (1999) Perception and understanding of effects of gravity and inertia on object motion. Developmental Science, 2(3), 339–362.Google Scholar
Krist, H. (2010) Development of intuitions about support beyond infancy. Developmental Psychology, 46(1), 266–278.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Legare, C. H. & Gelman, S. A. (2008) Bewitchment, biology, or both: the co-existence of natural and supernatural explanatory frameworks across development. Cognitive Science, 32(4), 607–642.Google Scholar
Legare, C. H., Opfer, J., Busch, J. T. A., & Shtulman, A. (2018) A field guide for teaching evolution in the social sciences. Evolution and Human Behavior, 39(3), 257–263.Google Scholar
Legare, C. H. & Shtulman, A. (2018) Explanatory pluralism across cultures and development. In Proust, J. & Fortier, M. (Eds.). Interdisciplinary approaches to metacognitive diversity (pp. 415–432). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Masson, M. E., Bub, D. N., & Lalonde, C. E. (2011) Video-game training and naïve reasoning about object motion. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 166–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayr, E. (1982) The growth of biological thought: diversity, evolution, and inheritance. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McCauley, R. N. (2011) Why religion is natural and science is not. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McCloskey, M. (1983a) Intuitive physics. Scientific American, 248(4), 122–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCloskey, M. (1983b) Naïve theories of motion. In Gentner, D. & Stevens, A. L. (Eds.). Mental models (pp. 299–324). Erlbaum.Google Scholar
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2016) Science literacy: concepts, contexts, and consequences. The National Academies Press.Google Scholar
National Science Board (2020) Science and engineering indicators. National Science Foundation.Google Scholar
Nersessian, N. J. (1989). Conceptual change in science and in science education. Synthese, 80(1), 163–183.Google Scholar
Novick, L. R., Shade, C. K., & Catley, K. M. (2011) Linear versus branching depictions of evolutionary history: implications for diagram design. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3(3), 536–559.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pobiner, B. (2016) Accepting, understanding, teaching, and learning (human) evolution: obstacles and opportunities. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 159(S61), 232–274.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Reiner, M., Slotta, J. D., Chi, M. T. H., & Resnick, L. B. (2000) Naïve physics reasoning: a commitment to substance-based conceptions. Cognition and Instruction, 18 (1), 1–34.Google Scholar
Renken, M. D. & Nunez, N. (2010) Evidence for improved conclusion accuracy after reading about rather than conducting a belief-inconsistent simple physics experiment. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(6), 792–811.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rutjens, B. T., van der Linden, S., & van der Lee, R. (2021) Science skepticism in times of COVID-19. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 24(2), 276–283.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. (2006) Qualitative differences between naïve and scientific theories of evolution. Cognitive Psychology, 52(2), 170–194.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. (2017) Scienceblind: why our intuitive theories about the world are so often wrong. Basic Books.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. (2019) Doubly counterintuitive: cognitive obstacles to the discovery and the learning of scientific ideas and why they often differ. In Samuels, R. & Wilkenfeld, D. (Eds.). Advances in experimental philosophy of science (pp. 97–121). Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Calabi, P. (2012) Cognitive constraints on the understanding and acceptance of evolution. In Rosengren, K. S., Brem, S., Evans, E. M., & Sinatra, G. (Eds.). Evolution challenges: Integrating research and practice in teaching and learning about evolution (pp. 47–65). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Calabi, P. (2013) Tuition vs. intuition: effects of instruction on naïve theories of evolution. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 59(2), 141–167.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Harrington, K. (2016) Tensions between science and intuition across the lifespan. Topics in Cognitive Science, 8(1), 118–137.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Legare, C. H. (2020) Competing explanations of competing explanations: accounting for conflict between scientific and folk explanations. Topics in Cognitive Science, 12(4), 1337–1362.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A., Neal, C., & Lindquist, G. (2016) Children’s ability to learn evolutionary explanations for biological adaptation. Early Education and Development, 27(8), 1222–1236.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Lombrozo, T. (2016) Bundles of contradiction: a coexistence view of conceptual change. In Barner, D. & Baron, A. (Eds.). Core knowledge and conceptual change (pp. 49–67). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Schulz, L. (2008). The relation between essentialist beliefs and evolutionary reasoning. Cognitive Science, 32(6), 1049–1062.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shtulman, A., Villalobos, A., & Ziel, D. (2021) Whitewashing nature: sanitized depictions of biology in children’s books and parent–child conversation. Child Development, 92(6), 2356–2374.Google Scholar
Shtulman, A. & Valcarcel, J. (2012) Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions. Cognition, 124(2), 209–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spelke, E. S., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992) Origins of knowledge. Psychological Review, 99(4), 605–632.Google Scholar
Steinberg, M. S., Brown, D. E., & Clement, J. (1990) Genius is not immune to persistent misconceptions: conceptual difficulties impeding Isaac Newton and contemporary physics students. International Journal of Science Education, 12(3), 265–273.Google Scholar
Trundle, K. C., Atwood, R. K., & Christopher, J. E. (2007) A longitudinal study of conceptual change: preservice elementary teachers’ conceptions of moon phases. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 44(2), 303–326.Google Scholar
Villegas, P. (2020). South Dakota nurse says many patients deny the coronavirus exists right up until death. The Washington Post, November 6.Google Scholar
Vosniadou, S. (1994) Capturing and modeling the process of conceptual change. Learning and Instruction, 4(1), 45–69.Google Scholar
Vosniadou, S., Ioannides, C., Dimitrakopoulou, A., & Papademetriou, E. (2001) Designing learning environments to promote conceptual change in science. Learning and Instruction, 11(4–5), 381–419.Google Scholar
Ware, E. A. & Gelman, S. A. (2014) You get what you need: an examination of purpose-based inheritance reasoning in undergraduates, preschoolers, and biological experts. Cognitive Science, 38(2), 197–243.Google Scholar
Weisberg, D. S., Landrum, A. R., Metz, S. E., & Weisberg, M. (2018) No missing link: knowledge predicts acceptance of evolution in the United States. BioScience, 68(3), 212–222.Google Scholar
Young, A. G. & Shtulman, A. (2020) How children’s cognitive reflection shapes their science understanding. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 1247.Google Scholar