IS China a peaceful, defensive-minded power or a bellicose, expansionist state? Has China become more belligerent in recent decades? How can contemporary depictions of a bellicose China be reconciled with earlier descriptions of a dominant pacifist tradition?

I contend that existing depictions of China's strategic culture are flawed. China's strategic disposition cannot accurately be characterized as either pacifist or bellicose. China, I argue, has a dualistic strategic culture. The two main strands are a Confucian one, which is conflict-averse and defensive-minded, and a Realpolitik one that favors military solutions and is offense-oriented. Both of these two strands are active and both influence and combine in dialectic fashion to produce what I label a “Chinese Cult of Defense.” Just as the “Cult of Offense” identified by Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder had a critical effect in precipitating World War I, so the Cult of Defense increases the likelihood that China will be involved in a future war. This cult predisposes Chinese leaders paradoxically to engage in offensive military operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and a last resort. This dualistic strategic culture has been a constant, and China has not become more bellicose or dangerous in recent years except to the extent that its military capabilities have improved and military doctrine has changed (see Chapter 3).

This chapter seeks to reconcile contrasting interpretations of Chinese strategic culture.