Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- 2 Money
- 3 Monetary Control in the UK
- 4 Pristine and Parsimonious Policy
- 5 Central Bank Talk about Future Monetary Policy
- 6 Bank Capital and Monetary Policy Transmission
- 7 When Are Central Banks More Likely to Target Asset Prices?
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- Index
- References
4 - Pristine and Parsimonious Policy
Can Central Banks Ever Get Back to It and Why They Should Try
from Part I - Monetary Economics and Policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2018
By
Book contents
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgement
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- Part I Monetary Economics and Policy
- 2 Money
- 3 Monetary Control in the UK
- 4 Pristine and Parsimonious Policy
- 5 Central Bank Talk about Future Monetary Policy
- 6 Bank Capital and Monetary Policy Transmission
- 7 When Are Central Banks More Likely to Target Asset Prices?
- Part II Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy
- Part III Foreign Exchanges and International Architecture
- Part IV The Millennium Challenges of Central Banks
- Index
- References
Summary
Central banks are more powerful than for almost a century, which has contributed to discomfort and some criticism amongst commentators. This chapter reviews some of the current threats to their independence in making the case that central bank mandates need to comply with general criteria for the legitimacy of unelected power. Those criteria are developed into general principles for constraining central bank balance sheet management. This is necessary to stop central banks occupying fiscal territory for too long.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking , pp. 48 - 64Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018
References
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