Introduction

One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behaviour of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ‘pulled’ by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ‘pushed’ from behind by quasi-inertial forces. The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, sticking to the prescribed behaviour even if new and apparently better options become available. The former is easily caricatured as a self-contained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless plaything of social forces or the passive executor of inherited standards. In this chapter I attempt to characterize this contrast more fully. I also argue that while social norms are extremely important for solving the first problem of social order, their contribution to the second problem is more ambiguous. Social norms do coordinate expectations. They may or may not help people to achieve cooperation.

Generally speaking, three solutions have been proposed to resolve the opposition between the two paradigms. First, there is the eclectic argument that some forms of behaviour are best explained on the assumption that people act rationally, whereas others can be explained by something like the theory of social norms. Alternatively, the eclectic view could be that both rationality and social norms are among the determinants of most actions.