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38. - Conception

from C

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Martin Lin
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The notion of conception – the relation x is conceived through y – is a part of the undefined primitive vocabulary in terms of which Spinoza states many of his most important philosophical doctrines. Notable among these are: (1) the definitions of the basic ontological categories; (2) his account of causation; (3) the nature of the attributes; and (4) his account of mind–body identity. This entry will examine how Spinoza employs the notion of conception with respect to all of these issues.

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Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 94 - 97
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Della Rocca, M. (2008a). Spinoza. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2008b). Rationalism run amok. In Huenemann, C. (ed.), Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays (pp. 67–84). Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garrett, D. (2002). Spinoza’s conatus argument. In Koistinen, O. and Biro, J. (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes (pp. 127–58). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin, M. (2019). Being and Reason: An Essay on Spinoza’s Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Melamed, Y. (2012). Inherence, causation, and conceivability in Spinoza. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 50(3), 365–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrison, J. (2013). The relation between conception and causation in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(3), 1–17.Google Scholar
Newlands, S. (2010). Another kind of Spinozistic monism. Noûs, 44(3), 469–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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