In order to understand the relation between Cicero and the Academy we must start by giving up a number of interpretative schemes that we might be tempted to apply. For example, it is best to avoid as much as possible the use of the concept of Scepticism. Not only did it not exist linguistically in Latin, but Cicero himself did not regard Pyrrho as a Sceptic and seems not to have known about the renewal of Pyrrhonism by Aenesidemus, even though he and Aenesidemus were contemporaries. Thinking about Scepticism without its Pyrrhonian component is, for us, if not impossible at least very difficult. But for Cicero it was only the New Academy which gave definite form to the idea of doubt, something that was admittedly already present in other philosophers, but was still undeveloped. Further, for us Scepticism is a self-sufficient philosophical orientation, whereas the New Academy’s account of doubt poses for Cicero the problem of both institutional and philosophical continuity with Plato, whom he never presents as exclusively a philosopher of doubt. In addition, our conception of what it is to adhere to a certain philosophical orientation is derived from the Greek model. However, Cicero was not a professional philosopher, and the social location of philosophy was in any case different in Rome. By his own efforts the homo nouus had become consul, and then consularis. This meant that because of his origins he was located rather at the margins of the nobilitas, and yet he could not ignore the political and social codes that were associated with his rank.