
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- I Medieval philosophical literature
- II Aristotle in the middle ages
- III The old logic
- IV Logic in the high middle ages: semantic theory
- V Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities
- 14 Topics: their development and absorption into consequences
- 15 Consequences
- 16 Obligations
- 17 Modal logic
- 18 Future contingents
- VI Metaphysics and epistemology
- VII Natural philosophy
- VIII Philosophy of mind and action
- IX Ethics
- X Politics
- XI The defeat, neglect, and revival of scholasticism
- Index nominum
- Index rerum
- References
18 - Future contingents
from V - Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2008
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- I Medieval philosophical literature
- II Aristotle in the middle ages
- III The old logic
- IV Logic in the high middle ages: semantic theory
- V Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities
- 14 Topics: their development and absorption into consequences
- 15 Consequences
- 16 Obligations
- 17 Modal logic
- 18 Future contingents
- VI Metaphysics and epistemology
- VII Natural philosophy
- VIII Philosophy of mind and action
- IX Ethics
- X Politics
- XI The defeat, neglect, and revival of scholasticism
- Index nominum
- Index rerum
- References
Summary
Three problems involving future contingents
There is more than one problem of future contingents. There is first the problem raised by Aristotle – that of reconciling the principle of bivalence (the principle that for any sentence P either P is true or not-P is true) with the view that some claims about the future are contingent, are such that neither the claim nor its denial is necessarily true. Medieval discussions of this problem often rely on our intuitions that the past and the present are ‘fixed’ in some way in which the future is not, and so these discussions often illuminate medieval views on tense and modality.
A second problem has to do with the possibility of foreknowledge. Can one hold both that some future event is contingent and that it is foreknown?
A third problem is specifically theological. Can complete knowledge of the future by an immutable, infallible, impassible God be reconciled with the contingency of some aspects of the future?
These are distinct problems. Theories which solve the problem of contingent truth may fail to account for foreknowledge, and theories which account for both future contingent truth and foreknowledge may yet fail to explain how contingent future events, e.g. sins, can be known by a knower who cannot be causally acted upon.
Yet all three problems are variations on a single theme. We are inclined to think that there is an objective difference between the past and the future.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge History of Later Medieval PhilosophyFrom the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600, pp. 358 - 382Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1982
References
- 42
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