Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- 11 Truth and Theories of Truth
- 12 Reference and Theories of Reference
- 13 Names in Philosophy
- 14 Indexicals and Contextual Involvement
- 15 Natural Kind Terms
- 16 Vagueness in Natural Language
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- Part VI Some Extensions
- References
- Index
16 - Vagueness in Natural Language
from Part III - From Truth to Vagueness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2021
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- 11 Truth and Theories of Truth
- 12 Reference and Theories of Reference
- 13 Names in Philosophy
- 14 Indexicals and Contextual Involvement
- 15 Natural Kind Terms
- 16 Vagueness in Natural Language
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- Part VI Some Extensions
- References
- Index
Summary
John is rich, Katherine is tall, Derek is intelligent, This chili is spicy, we hear such expressions uttered all the time and they do not seem in the least problematic. On the contrary, it appears that we could not do without them. They are incredibly convenient: if instead of saying that Katherine is tall we had to specify exactly how tall she is and instead of saying that John is rich we had to provide a list of all his assets and belongings, we would not be able to communicate at all. On the one hand, we do not usually have all the relevant facts, and on the other – even if we had them – specifying all the details is time-consuming and ineffective. It is much easier to use rough-and-ready evaluations such as tall – short, rich – poor, etc. The common feature of all such assessments is their vagueness. Predicates like rich, tall, and intelligent are vague in a sense that their extensions seem not to have precise boundaries.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language , pp. 300 - 316Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021