Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Continuity and Change in Investor Protection
- Part I Institutionalization and Investor Protection
- 1 The Financialization of Corporate Governance
- 2 “Public” Mutual Funds
- 3 The Overlooked Effects of Passive Management
- 4 Retail Investor Protection and Empowerment: Reflections from the European Union
- 5 Which Investors to Protect?
- Part II The Scope of Investor Protection Regulation
- Part III The Regulation of Market Professionals
- Part IV Alternative Regulatory Regimes
- Index
1 - The Financialization of Corporate Governance
from Part I - Institutionalization and Investor Protection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 October 2022
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Continuity and Change in Investor Protection
- Part I Institutionalization and Investor Protection
- 1 The Financialization of Corporate Governance
- 2 “Public” Mutual Funds
- 3 The Overlooked Effects of Passive Management
- 4 Retail Investor Protection and Empowerment: Reflections from the European Union
- 5 Which Investors to Protect?
- Part II The Scope of Investor Protection Regulation
- Part III The Regulation of Market Professionals
- Part IV Alternative Regulatory Regimes
- Index
Summary
There is a robust debate in progress between proponents of shareholder primacy, or the theory that corporations should be run for the benefit of shareholders, and proponents of stakeholder governance, or the theory that corporations should be run for additional constituencies also. Members of the academic community,1 the business world,2 and law firms3 are all participants in the conversation. This is a long-standing controversy, going back to the competing views of Professors Dodd and Berle in the 1930s.4 Corporate purpose seems to be questioned whenever loss of faith in the business community leads to clamors for reform. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, there also is a loss of faith in political leadership. Our social, economic, and political problems have been laid bare by the pandemic, and so thinkers about corporate governance are renewing questions about corporate purpose and fiduciary duty.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection , pp. 23 - 39Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022