Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- 27 Gustav Radbruch’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 28 Good Order and Workable Arrangements: Lon Fuller’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 29 Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism
- 30 Tracing Finnis’s Criticism of Hart’s Internal Point of View: Instability and the ‘Point’ of Human Action in Law
- 31 Alexy’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 32 Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
- 33 Positivism and Totalitarianism
- Index
- References
33 - Positivism and Totalitarianism
from Part VI - Critique
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 January 2021
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- 27 Gustav Radbruch’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 28 Good Order and Workable Arrangements: Lon Fuller’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 29 Dworkin’s Critique of Hart’s Positivism
- 30 Tracing Finnis’s Criticism of Hart’s Internal Point of View: Instability and the ‘Point’ of Human Action in Law
- 31 Alexy’s Critique of Legal Positivism
- 32 Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
- 33 Positivism and Totalitarianism
- Index
- References
Summary
Dyzenhaus argues that Hart’s defence of legal positivism fails because Hart cannot without contradiction espouse both the claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and the claim that law has authority, that is, Herrschaft, not mere Macht. Moreover, in combination, the two claims result in what Spanish-speaking legal scholars have referred to as ideological positivism. Dyzenhaus argues, more specifically, that although Hart argued that legal positivism in the shape of the separation thesis is conducive to clear thinking and facilitates critical assessment of the law, his failure to follow through on his insights about the authority of law leads to a theory of law that is not free from the undesirable political (theoretical) consequences associated with totalitarianism, alleged by several critics of positivism.
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- Information
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 764 - 785Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021