Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- Index
- References
Part VI - Critique
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 January 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 625 - 785Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
References
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