Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-06T13:48:20.239Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

31 - Alexy’s Critique of Legal Positivism

from Part VI - Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2021

Torben Spaak
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
Get access

Summary

Sieckmann argues that the central claim of Robert Alexy’s criticism of legal positivism is that there is a necessary connection between morality and the content of law, and that the separation thesis is thus false. In his earlier writings Alexy adduced three distinct arguments in support of the connection thesis: the argument from injustice, the argument from principles, and the argument from the necessary claim of law to correctness. He later substituted for these a more general argument from the dual nature of law. Alexy situates his critique within the perspective of a participant, as distinguished from the perspective of an observer. Sieckmann maintains that Alexy changed the focus of the debate about legal positivism from an exclusive concern with questions of legal validity to a more general concern with questions of the nature of law by emphasising that in addition to the usual classifying connections between morality, on the one hand, and legal systems, acts and norms, on the other, there are also qualifying connections. Sieckmann concludes that Alexy showed legal positivism to be a not fully satisfactory theory of law for those adopting the participant’s perspective.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexy, R. 2002a. The Argument from Injustice. Trans. Paulson, S. and Paulson, B.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2002b. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Trans. Rivers, J.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2007. ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’. In Pavlakos, G. (ed.). Law, Rights and Discourse. Hart: 3755.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2008. ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’. Ratio Juris 21: 281–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, R. 2010. ‘The Dual Nature of Law’. Ratio Juris 23: 167–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, R. 2012. ‘Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights’. Ratio Juris 24: 214.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2013a. ‘Between Positivism and Non-positivism: A Third Reply to Bulygin’. In Ferrer Beltrán, J., Moreso, J. J. and Papayannis, D. M. (eds.). Neutrality and Theory of Law. Springer: 225–38.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2013b. ‘Some Reflections on the Ideal Dimension of Law and on the Legal Philosophy of John Finnis’. American Journal of Jurisprudence 58: 97110.Google Scholar
Alexy, R. 2015. ‘Legal Certainty and Correctness’. Ratio Juris 28: 441–51.Google Scholar
Allan, T. R. S. 2017. ‘In Defence of Radbruch’s Formula: Injustice, Interpretation, and Invalidity’. In Borowski, M., Paulson, S. and Sieckmann, J. (eds.). Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Mohr Siebeck: 87104.Google Scholar
Bix, B. 2006. ‘Robert Alexy’s Radbruch Formula and the Nature of Law’. Rechtstheorie 37: 139–49.Google Scholar
Bulygin, E. 2013. ‘Alexy between Positivism and Non-positivism’. In Ferrer Beltrán, J., Moreso, J. J. and Papayannis, D. M. (eds.). Neutrality and Theory of Law. Springer: 4959.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. 2nd ed. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, R. 1986. Law’s Empire. Fontana Press.Google Scholar
Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Finnis, J. 2014. ‘Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy on Law’s Ideal Dimension’. American Journal of Jurisprudence 59: 85109.Google Scholar
García Figueroa, A. 1998. Principios y positivismo jurídico. Centro de estudios políticos y constitucionales.Google Scholar
Gardner, J. 2012. ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’. In Gardner, J.. Law as a Leap of Faith. Oxford University Press: 1953.Google Scholar
Habermas, J. 1994. Faktizität und Geltung. 4th ed. Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1983. ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’. In Hart, H. L. A.. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Clarendon Press: 4987.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1994, The Concept of Law. 2nd ed. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Kelsen, H. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre. Deuticke.Google Scholar
MacCormick, N. 2007. ‘Why Law Makes No Claims’. In Pavlakos, G. (ed.). Law, Rights, and Discourse. Hart: 5967.Google Scholar
Marmor, A. 2001. Positive Law and Objective Values. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Paulson, S. 2012. ‘Justified Normativity’. In Klatt, M. (ed.). The Institutionalization of Reason. Oxford University Press: 61111.Google Scholar
Paulson, S. 2017. ‘The Makings of a Radical Norm Theory: Hans Kelsen’s Theory of the Sanction-Norm as Empowering Norm’. In Borowski, M., Paulson, S. and Sieckmann, J. (eds.). Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Mohr Siebeck: 589630.Google Scholar
Radbruch, G. 1946. ‘Gesetzliches Recht und übergesetzliches Unrecht’. Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung: 105–8.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. 3rd ed. Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 2007. ‘The Argument from Injustice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’. In Pavlakos, G. (ed.). Law, Rights, and Discourse. Hart: 1735.Google Scholar
Sieckmann, J. 1990. Regelmodelle und Prinzipienmodelle des Rechtsystems. Nomos.Google Scholar
Sieckmann, J. 2012. The Logic of Autonomy. Hart.Google Scholar
Waldron, J. 1996. ‘Kant’s Legal Positivism’. Harvard Law Review 109: 1535–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waldron, J. 2001. ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’. In Coleman, J. (ed.). Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law. Oxford University Press: 410–33.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×