As the idea of an ultimate foundation for moral and political beliefs has become increasingly implausible, theorists have turned to “discourse” to provide a basis on which to defend the legitimacy of social and political practices. The turn to discourse, which includes but is not limited to communicative ethics, is in part a move from a substantive to a procedural conception of moral and political theory. Rather than providing values grounded in an account of human nature or reason, discourse-based approaches offer a set of procedures that, if followed, would yield principles legitimating social practices and institutions. The fundamental intuition underlying the move to discourse is the ideal of a moral community, one whose norms and practices are fully acceptable to those subject to them, a society based not on imposition, but on the agreement of free and equal persons.

Jürgen Habermas has presented one of the most powerful accounts of a discourse-based morality,- it is grounded in an understanding of practical reason which explains how the validity of norms can be tested, thereby demonstrating their cognitive character. According to Habermas, valid norms can be freely accepted by all of the individuals who are affected by them. Thus, a society whose institutions and practices were governed by valid norms would instantiate the ideal of a moral community.