Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
10 - The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
from Part II
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2020
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
Summary
This chapter explores why we should think common sense has epistemic authority. First, it lays out exactly what common sense and the supposed epistemic authority of common sense amount to. It then assesses seven proposals that we find in the literature as to why common sense has epistemic authority. They say, respectively, that common-sense beliefs are irresistible; that there are no serious epistemic alternatives to thinking that common-sense beliefs have epistemic authority; that common-sense beliefs are certain, or at least more certain than any alternatives; that common-sense beliefs are instances of knowledge; that common-sense beliefs are vague and ambiguous and, therefore, likely to be true; that common-sense beliefs are the product of a reliable process of cultural evolution; and, finally, that God would not deceive us on such a large scale. The chapter argues that the first five answers are not convincing, not even jointly, but that the sixth answer is and that the seventh reply may well be combined with it.
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- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy , pp. 225 - 246Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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