Throughout 1943 and 1944, British policy towards Bulgaria had been driven by the necessity to force the country out of the war and so break the main Axis link in the Balkans. British efforts were only partly successful, as Soviet pressure proved to be the primary factor behind Bulgaria's exit from the conflict. British diplomats had foreseen the increased role of the Soviet Union in South Eastern Europe in the final stages of the war and expected it to grow and extend into the postwar period. The sober acknowledgement of Soviet strength implied adaptation of British long-term interests.

Whitehall plans for the preservation of Britain's international role consistently recognized the Balkan Peninsula's strategic importance. Both before and during the war, Britain had paid a great deal of attention to its traditional ally Greece; considerable diplomatic and military resources had also been invested in the effort to enlist neutral Turkey in the Allies’ camp. The British government had a vested interest in the security, stability and prosperity of these two countries which guarded the approaches to the Straits. British analysis of the consequences of Soviet strategic gains near the Straits should also cover the possibility of ‘export’ of the Soviet sociopolitical system to the area. Most importantly, the British government faced the question of whether Soviet Russia would use the countries it had occupied at the end of the war in order to penetrate the continent even further to the south and west.