This study is the first to examine Brazil's international ethanol strategy from a Neoclassical Realist perspective. Under Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, Brazil had the explicit foreign policy goal to create a global market for fuel ethanol comparative to the global oil market. Given the benevolent international environment for greater use of biofuels in the early 2000s, with questions of energy security, climate change and South–South cooperation on the top of the international agenda, it is puzzling why Brazil failed to create a global ethanol market despite the beneficial international context. This research question was guided by a set of sub-questions:

• • What is Brazil's international ethanol strategy?

• • How was Brazil's international ethanol strategy elaborated and by whom?

• • Who are the central stakeholders within Brazil and abroad that are involved in the process of implementing Brazil's international ethanol strategy?

• • What power relationships are at play within Brazil and towards its partners that influence the implementation of Brazil's international ethanol strategy?

• • What are the turning points in Brazil's ethanol diplomacy and how did these happen?

• • How can the processes and outcomes be explained within the realm of IR theory?

The study relied on a case study design with three empirical chapters. The first two empirical chapters represented two dimensions of bilateral relations, Brazil–US and Brazil–Mozambique, where Brazil is in a relatively weak position in the former and in a strong position in the latter. The third empirical chapter analysed Brazil's multilateral ethanol diplomacy, in particular Brazil's actions in the WTO.

Process tracing was applied to test Neoclassical Realist hypotheses at the necessary points of analysis. The data for this work was gathered by document and literature research as well as during field work that led to almost 80 expert interviews.

The three empirical chapters showed mixed results of Brazilian foreign policy making. As Ricupero (2010: 29) states, ‘Progress varies just as the distance between Brazil's pretensions and reality’, and in none of the cases were objectives fully achieved. Three main threads continue through all of the chapters:

• -Ethanol was not of the highest priority and was subordinate to other strategic goals.

• -The heterogeneity and lack of coordination within Brazil's foreign policy complex (FPC) made its foreign policy less effective.