Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF BICAMERAL DIVERSITY
- Introduction to Part I
- 1 Bicameralism in historical perspective
- 2 The institutions of bicameralism
- PART II MODELS OF BICAMERAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART III EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BICAMERALISM AND IMPLICATIONS
- Conclusions
- References
- Index
2 - The institutions of bicameralism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Series editors' preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF BICAMERAL DIVERSITY
- Introduction to Part I
- 1 Bicameralism in historical perspective
- 2 The institutions of bicameralism
- PART II MODELS OF BICAMERAL INSTITUTIONS
- PART III EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BICAMERALISM AND IMPLICATIONS
- Conclusions
- References
- Index
Summary
Given the diverse national paths in the development of bicameral legislatures, it is not surprising to find substantial institutional variation. In this chapter, we explore these institutional differences. The characteristics of lower and upper legislative houses differ on a number of dimensions, and analysts have relied on these differences to explain cross-national variations in upper house power. Although there are variations in size, legislative term of office, turnover, membership, representativeness, and institutional power, two particular characteristics have been emphasized. The first is the membership of the two houses, based on selection methods and categories of citizens represented. The second is the relative power of the two houses as reflected in their mechanisms for resolving intercameral differences. Here we focus on these two critical dimensions of variation.
Political analysts who examine the variation in bicameral institutions argue that bicameralism produces disparate results across countries. Lijphart (1984) attributes variation to the degree of congruence between the two legislative houses and power asymmetries, whereas Mastias and Grangé (1987) focus on upper house legitimacy as the important independent variable.
Lijphart (1984: 99) defines “congruence” as similarity of political composition. Regardless of the variations in selection methods, if the two houses have similar political representation, they are deemed congruent. Disparities in power range from full symmetry, where agreement of the two houses is necessary to enact a law, to total asymmetry, where one house is granted decision-making power. Using these two categories, Lijphart constructs three types of bicameralism. He argues that “strong” bicameral legislatures are characterized by significant differences in composition and by relatively symmetric power. “Weak” bicameral legislatures are characterized either by asymmetric power or by congruent chambers.
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- Bicameralism , pp. 44 - 70Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997